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Abstract
Automated diagnosis and reconfiguration are im-
portant computational techniques that aim to mini-
mize human intervention in autonomous systems.
In this paper, we develop novel techniques and
models in the context of diagnosis and reconfig-
uration reasoning using causal Bayesian networks
(BNs). We take as starting point a successful diag-
nostic approach, using a static BN developed for a
real-world electrical power system. We discuss in
this paper the extension of this diagnostic approach
along two dimensions, namely: (i) from a static BN
to a dynamic BN; and (ii) from a diagnostic task to
a reconfiguration task.
More specifically, we discuss the auto-generation
of a dynamic Bayesian network from a static
Bayesian network. In addition, we discuss subtle,
but important, differences between Bayesian net-
works when used for diagnosis versus reconfigu-
ration. We discuss a novel reconfiguration agent,
which models a system causally, including effects
of actions through time, using a dynamic Bayesian
network.
Though the techniques we discuss are general, we
demonstrate them in the context of electrical power
systems (EPSs) for aircraft and spacecraft. EPSs
are vital subsystems on-board aircraft and space-
craft, and many incidents and accidents of these ve-
hicles have been attributed to EPS failures. We dis-
cuss a case study that provides initial but promising
results for our approach in the setting of electrical
power systems.
1 Introduction
Automated diagnosis and reconfiguration are important tech-
niques aimed at minimizing human intervention in au-
tonomous systems. In many domains, including both manned
and unmanned NASA missions, diagnosis and reconfigura-
tion techniques promise to play an increasing role.
This paper is concerned with the design of automated diag-
nosis and reconfiguration systems. Following our belief that
it is important to consider challenging and significant real-
world problems, we demonstrate our approach in an appli-
cation domain of great interest to NASA, namely, electrical
power systems. Electrical power plays an increasing role in
aerospace [Bromaghim et al., 2002; Button and Chicatelli,
2005; Poll et al., 2007], and clearly also in terrestrial sys-
tems, with a renewed emphasis on upgrading the power grid
in the United States and on electrical vehicles.
Unfortunately, electrical power is associated with
aerospace incidents and accidents, of which we now mention
a few. On September 2, 1998, Swissair flight 111 crashed
into the Atlantic Ocean, killing everyone aboard. It was
later determined that short-circuited wires most likely led
to a catastrophic fire onboard the aircraft. The Electric
Propulsion Space Experiment mission, launched and oper-
ated in early 1999, ended prematurely when the spacecraft
experienced a catastrophic battery failure. On January 14
2005, an Intelsat-operated communications satellite suffered
a total loss after a sudden and unexpected electrical power
system anomaly. Most likely, the failure was caused by a
high-current event in the battery circuitry triggered by an
electrostatic discharge. On November 2, 2006 the Mars
Global Surveyor last communicated with Earth. It is believed
that a software error oriented the spacecraft to an angle that
over-exposed it to sunlight, causing the battery to overheat
and thereby disabling all communication. On January 7
2008, a Boeing 747 lost main power on its descent into
Bangkok because of water entering the generator control
unit, and had to use its battery backup. Since this incident
occurred while the aircraft was descending into Bangkok,
there were no serious consequences, but the loss could have
been critical had it taken place over the Pacific ocean.
With the goal of decreasing such incidents and accidents,
we develop in this paper novel techniques and models in
the context of diagnosis and reconfiguration reasoning us-
ing causal Bayesian networks (BNs) [Pearl, 1988; Getoor and
Taskar, 2007], and demonstrate them in the EPS setting. This
work is part of a larger effort, beyond the scope of this paper,
of researching how Bayesian networks can be utilized within
an agent framework. In the agent setting, we hypothesize that
Bayesian networks will eventually turn out to be useful in in-
tegrating diagnosis, prognosis, reconfiguration, and (active)
machine learning.
We take as a starting point a successful diagnostic ap-
proach, using a static BN developed for a real-world electrical
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power system [Mengshoel et al., 2008; Ricks and Mengshoel,
2009; Mengshoel et al., 2009]. We discuss in this paper the
extension of this diagnostic approach along two dimensions,
namely: (i) from a static BN to a dynamic BN; and (ii) from
a diagnostic task to a reconfiguration task. More specifically,
we discuss the auto-generation of a dynamic Bayesian net-
work from a static Bayesian network. In addition, we discuss
subtle, but important, differences between Bayesian networks
when used for diagnosis versus reconfiguration. We discuss
a novel reconfiguration agent, which models a system in a
causal manner, including effects of actions through time, us-
ing a dynamic Bayesian network. Though the techniques we
discuss are general, we demonstrate them in the context of
electrical power systems (EPSs) for aircraft and spacecraft.
EPSs are, as indicated above, vital subsystems on-board air-
craft and spacecraft. We specifically consider the ADAPT
EPS, an electrical power system testbed located at the NASA
Ames Research Center [Poll et al., 2007]. ADAPT is rep-
resentative of electrical power systems found in aircraft and
spacecraft, and has been developed for the purpose of inves-
tigating and benchmarking different aerospace vehicle health
management techniques. We additionally discuss a case study
on a small subset of the ADAPT EPS that provides initial but
promising results for our BN-based approach when applied
to electrical power systems in aircraft and spacecraft.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2,
we briefly summarize background concepts before discussing
our overall approach and algorithms in Section 3. An electri-
cal power system case study is discussed in Section 4, and
Section 5 concludes the paper and outlines future work.
2 Background
A Bayesian network (BN) structures a multi-variate probabil-
ity distribution by using a directed acyclic graph (DAG). Our
main emphasis will be on discrete BN nodes. A (discrete)
BN node V is a discrete random variable with a mutually
exclusive, exhaustive, and finite state space QV = Q (V) =
{v1 , ..., v..}. We use the notation IIV for the parents of a
node V, ΨV
 
for the children of V, and πV for an instantiation
of all parents IIV of V. The notion of a Bayesian network
can now be introduced [Pearl, 1988].
Definition 1(Bayesian network) A Bayesian network is a
tuple (V, W, P), where (V, W) is a DAG with nodes
V = {V1 , ...Vn }, edges W = {W1 ,..., W..}, and where P
= {Pr(V1 I IIV1 ), ... , Pr(Vn I IIVn ) } is a set of conditional
probability tables (CPTs). For each node Vi E V there is
one CPT, which defines a conditional probability distribution
Pr(Vi
 I IIVi ).
The independence assumptions induced by (V, W) in Def-
inition 1 imply the following joint distribution:
n
Pr(v) = Pr(V1 = v1 , ... Vn = vn) =
	





C {Vi+1, ... , Vn} .
A BN can be provided evidence by setting or clamping
some variables to known states. These nodes are called ev-
idence variables. In our setting, evidence variables are com-
mands, sensor readings, or goals (see Section 3 for details).
Taking into account the input on evidence variables, different
probabilistic queries can be answered [Pearl, 1988]. These
probabilistic queries include marginals, most probable expla-
nation (MPE), and maximum aposteriori probability (MAP).
Though probabilistic queries can be used for many purposes,
in past work on diagnosis (but not reconfiguration) we query
health variables representing the health of components, sen-
sors, or both [Mengshoel et al., 2008]. For this work, which
includes both diagnosis and reconfiguration, we query action
nodes that represent reconfiguration commands after aug-
menting the evidence with the desired state. Further details
are in Sections 3 and 4.
It has been shown that exact MPE computation is NP-hard
[Shimony, 1994], and approximating an MPE to within a con-
stant ratio-bound has also been proven to be NP-hard [Ab-
delbar and Hedetnieme, 1998]. There are two broad classes
of approaches to Bayesian network inference: interpretation
and compilation. In interpretation approaches, a Bayesian
network is directly used for inference. In compilation ap-
proaches, such as the clique tree [Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter,
1988; Shenoy, 1989] and arithmetic circuit [Darwiche, 2003;
Chavira and Darwiche, 2007] approaches, a Bayesian net-
work is off-line compiled into a secondary data structure, and
this secondary data structure is then used for on-line infer-
ence. In clique tree clustering, inference consists of propaga-
tion in a clique tree compiled from a Bayesian network. In
arithmetic circuit evaluation, inference is performed within
an arithmetic circuit that was compiled from a Bayesian net-
work. Computation time depends on a number of structural
and numerical factors associated with a BN and is not yet,
despite recent progress, sufficiently understood.
For the purpose of this paper, we emphasize causal
Bayesian networks, which (informally) are BNs that reflect
the causal structure of a domain. For example, in an EPS BN,
there is an edge from a node representing the opening of a re-
lay to a node representing electrical current flowing through
the relay, and not the other way around (i.e., edge direction
is the causal direction). BNs have been successfully applied
in a wide range of domains, and the techniques developed in
this paper are general. However, for illustrative purposes, we
consider electrical power systems.
We now briefly consider related research, particularly re-
search that considers Bayesian networks to diagnose and re-
configure. Bayesian networks have in the past been used
for model-based diagnosis and monitoring of EPSs [Chien
et al., 2002; Yongli et al., 2006; Mengshoel et al., 2008]
as well as for other purposes [Andreassen et al., 1987;
Lerner et al., 2000; Romessis and Mathioudakis, 2006], how-
ever this previous work generally does not integrate diag-
nosis and reconfiguration by means of the Bayesian net-
work itself. There has also been work in the area of self-
configuring systems [Williams and Nayak, 1996; Barrett,
2005], but this has often not been founded on Bayesian net-
works. Finally, there are decision-theoretic (including plan-
ning) approaches [Basye et al., 1992; Haddawy et al., 1995;
Boutilier et al., 1999]. Our research is simpler, and hence
potentially easier to deploy, since (i) we retrict ourselves to
finite-horizon reconfiguration and (ii) we do not rely on the
non-trivial specification of utilities (or reward function).
3 Architecture and Algorithms
From an abstract point of view, we focus on systems that re-
ceive service requests. In the case of an EPS, these requests
are for power to reach specific loads (i.e. receivers of elec-
trical power). We are interested in systems which are suf-
ficiently complex for a request (or a set of requests) to be
served in different ways. For example, EPSs in aerospace
vehicles often have redundancies and alternate routes such
that power can be supplied even in case of failure of a subset
of the components in an EPS. For the purpose of this work,
where we assume a fixed system design, we identify two sets
of agents:
1. Resource Requesters M = {r1 , r2 ,... } - agents that re-	 Figure 1: Diagram showing the interaction between the Sys-
quest resources from the system.	 tem Configurator, the EPS, and the Resource Requester.
2. System Configurators C = {c1 , c2 ,... } - agents that con-
figure (and reconfigure) the system in an attempt to meet
resource requests.
A human user of a system may play the role of both a Re-
source Requester and a System Configurator. However, as
system complexity increases, a human user may have diffi-
culty configuring the system accurately and quickly to meet
resource demands. An autonomous system configurator–a
self-configuring system–becomes desirable, since it may per-
form better than the human and free the person to focus on
other tasks. Our goal is to create an agent that reconfigures
systems. In the context of EPSs, that means accounting for
component and sensor failures while also minimizing power
loss by not providing power to locations where it has not been
requested. Assuming for simplicity |C| =1, we define the fol-
lowing problem statement:
The System Configuration problem Given periodic sen-
sory data (state observations) and knowledge of past
commands (actions), the System Configurator c1 should
issue commands to route power to Resource Requesters
M in the face of changing demands and system faults.
The architecture in Figure 1 reflects this problem.
3.1 Framing the problem as a POMDP
Sequential decision making tasks such as the one described
above are commonly modeled as Markov decision processes
(MDPs). A finite MDP is specified by the tuple (S, A, T, γ,
D, R). S and A are, respectively, the sets of possible states
and actions. T is a transition function, T: S x A x S —> R,
which gives the probability, given a state and an action, of
transitioning to another state on the next time step. γ, the
discount factor, exponentially decreases the value of a future
reward. D is the distribution of start states. R is a reward
function, R : S x S —> R, where the reward is a function
of states st and s t+1. A partially observable Markov decision
process (POMDP) describes a task for which the agent cannot
see the true environmental state, but rather can see an obser-
vation (from the set O of possible observations) that reflects
the true state and is generated with probability P (O | S). We
use a more specific definition of observations: an observation
o is simply the observable portion of the state s (i.e., O is a
subset of the state variables in S). Additionally, for exposi-
tory purposes, the hidden portion of some state s is called h
in this paper.
Relating the POMDP formalism to our Bayesian network
formalism the set of possible states S is the Cartesian product
of all non-command nodes V1, ..., Vn . (i.e., S = V1 x... x Vn ).
A is the Cartesian product of all command nodes.
Consider the problem statement above. Since the agent
has sensors that may not be reliable and often only indirectly
measure important states, we cast this problem as a POMDP.
However, in Section 3.3, we describe how it departs from the
formal POMDP specification.
3.2 Generation of a dynamic BN
In our previous work on designing a diagnostic algorithm for
an EPS, a large static Bayesian network was hand-created
using knowledge of dependencies within the system’s physi-
cal structure and documented error rates for individual com-
ponents [Mengshoel et al., 2008]. Dynamic bayesian net-
works have previously been used to model POMDPs with
success [Boutilier and Poole, 1996; Toussaint et al., 2006].
In a very related study, Kohda and Ciu use dynamic Bayesian
networks to model and reconfigure a simulated safety moni-
toring system [2007]. Following their leads, we created a dy-
namic Bayesian network from the hand-coded static Bayesian
network and used it to model the ADAPT EPS through time.
To create a dynamic Bayesian network from the static
Bayesian network which is used for fault diagnosis, we cre-
ated the following G ENERATEDBN algorithm:
1. Replicate the static Bayesian network for the number
of time steps that will be expressed by the dynamic
Bayesian network. For each node x in the static BN,
label its duplicates x 1, x2, ..., xn for the n time steps be-
ing expressed.
2. For any command node yn at time n that has an edge to
a node xn , remove that edge and replace it with an edge
to x 1. Relabel the command node as y_1.
3. For all other command nodes at some time t that have an
edge to a node xt , remove that edge and replace it with
an edge to xt+1.
4. For a node that describes the health of a component at
time t, create an edge from that node to its duplicate
node at time t + 1.
We argue that the dynamic BN created by GenerateDBN is
a BN. By assumption, the input BN is a BN. Since all edges in
the dynamic BN either come from the input BN or are added
by GenerateDBN, and in the latter case go from slice i to slice
i+1, acyclicity is preserved. In addition, CPTs are added for
all nodes in the dynamic BN that do not have CPTs defined
by the static BN.
For this work, we create a dynamic Bayesian network with
two time slices (n = 2). Henceforth, all discussion of the dy-
namic network assumes that n = 2. Given the large number
of nodes, converting the static Bayesian Network to an appro-
priate dynamic Bayesian Network by hand was not an option,
so we created a script that automatically made the described
changes.
3.3 Reconfiguration algorithm using the dynamic
BN
We define an action by the System Configurator to be any sub-
set of the set of all possible commands to the system. Com-
mands give orders to open or close either relays or switches.
At time t, we call the current command subset at. Addi-
tionally, ot is the agent’s observation as provided by sensors
within the EPS, and ht is the hidden state1.
Whether or not power is being supplied to all loads as re-
quested by the Resource Requester is described by boolean
variable gt . Here, gt is based on a one-to-one mapping be-
tween the states of a command node used by a Resource
Requestor and the corresponding Resource Requestor sta-
tus (or goal) node. In Figure 4, for example, the node
CommandRelay3 is a Resource Requestor command node,
while the VoltageRelay3 is the corresponding Resource Re-
questor status node. Here, the one-to-one mapping is as fol-
lows: cmdOpen maps to voltageLo, cmdClose maps to volt-
ageHi. Suppose that there are m such status nodes S = {S1 ,
. . ., S,,, }, corresponding to m Resource Requestor command
nodes R = {R1 , ..., R,,,, }. Then gt = {(S1,s 1 ), ...,
(S,,,, ,s,,, ) } represents the conjunction of requests. Note that
gt is not a part of the formal POMDP definition, and also
that there is a small but important distinction between a sta-
tus node and a sensor node. In particular, our formalization
allows for a sensor reading to have low posterior probability
for a given gt , but typically a sensor downstream of a Re-
source Requestor command node set to cmdClose will reflect
the command’s state with high probability.
Taking our example further, suppose that power (or volt-
age) is requested for the load in Figure 4. In other
words, CommandRelay3 is set to cmdClose by the Re-
source Requestor, leading to VoltageRelay3 being set to
voltageHi, i.e. gt = {(VoltageRelay3, voltageHi) }, since
1ot
 
and ht together define the full state st.
there is only one load, a light bulb. Given the appropri-
ate command being issued by the System Configurator (up-
stream of CommandRelay3), and components downstream
of VoltageRelay3 being healthy, the load’s sensor read-
ing should reflect the power that has been requested, i.e.
Pr(SensorLight1 = readLightHi) >> Pr(SensorLight1 =
readLightLo ) .
The conditions for gt (power supplied where requested) are
dictated by the Resource Requester at time t−1. ot , the sensor
information at time t, determines whether those conditions
have been satisfied. Since the agent does not perform policy
optimization, the environmental reward of the POMDP re-
mains unspecified and is not a part of the Bayesian network.
Instead, we use gt to define the agent’s goal. Thus our for-
mulation departs from the POMDP framework. However, in
future work, policy optimization will be done by converting
gt into a reward function, so thinking in terms of a POMDP
from the start may be useful.
From a probabilistic perspective, the optimal action is
argmaxatP (gt+1 = true I at , ht , ot ) . In both our static
and dynamic Bayesian networks, each observation node has
a causal link(s) from some subset of the hidden state nodes,
which simplifies the optimal action to argmaxatP(gt+1 =
true I at , ht ) . For n Boolean commands, there are 2n possi-
ble actions. Unfortunately, for large EPSs with a large num-
ber of possible commands, iterating through all possible ac-
tions is infeasible. The ADAPT EPS, for example, can sup-
port 24 Boolean commands at a time, yielding over ten mil-
lion possible actions. Calculating the above probability for
one of these actions is non-trivial, so ten million such cal-
culations could not be done in a real-time system requiring
reconfiguration. As a more tractable alternative, we approx-
imate argmaxatP(gt+1 = true I at , ht) by calculating
argmaxat P (at I gt+1 ,ht ) .
Though it may seem that this approach would have the
same problem of needing to iterate through an exponential
number of actions, we instead calculate the maximum a pos-
teriori probability (MAP) over all possible actions. To calcu-
late the a posteriori probability P(gt+1 I at , ht ) for a single
action, the agent would also have used a MAP calculation, so
we are reducing the computational complexity by an expo-
nential factor.
Unfortunately, the MAP inference problem is complete for
the complexity class NPPP [Park and Darwiche, 2004], but
can often be performed in reasonable time for small Bayesian
networks such as the example network described in Section 4.
For large but sparsely linked networks like the one created
for the ADAPT EPS, we instead calculate the most probable
explanation (MPE), or argmaxat , ot +1 , ht+1P (at I gt+1 ,ht )(i.e., maximizing over all unknown nodes in the network).
There is sufficient precedent for this, considering that MPE
is commonly used as an approximation for the more difficult
MAP calculation. Computing MPE for an arbitrary Bayesian
network is in the exponential time complexity class, but for
sparsely linked, large networks, it can nonetheless be calcu-
lated in real time.
Until this point, we have assumed that ht is known, which
is untrue. Instead, the agent calculates an approximation of
ht called ˆht based on Bayesian inference conditioned on ot ,
Figure 2: Windowing in a simple dynamic Bayesian network.
The moving rectangle encloses the actual dynamic BN.
at- 1 , and ˆht-1 .
At a high level, the agent’s algorithm, INFERDBN, is as
follows:
1. Receive observation ot. Fix the corresponding node
states.
2. Perform inference on the Bayesian network (or arith-
metic circuit) to estimate hidden state ˆht , using ot , at- 1 ,
and the previous estimate ˆht-1 . Fix the node states cor-
responding to ˆht
3. Slide the window of the dynamic Bayesian network from
time steps t — 1 and t to time steps t and t + 1, forget-
ting data held in time step t — 1 (this step, often called
“windowing”, is illustrated in Figure 2).
4. Fix the subset of the nodes for ot+1 which indicate
which loads are receiving power (from gt ).
5. Perform MAP inference (or approximation of MAP by
MPE) on the arithmetic circuit to determine most likely
command set to have caused the desired future state
(argmaxat P (at I ot , gt+1, ˆht )).
6. Issue maximizing command set at to the EPS
7. Unfix all previously fixed nodes for ot+1.
4 Case Study
Electrical power systems (EPSs) play a critical role in
aerospace. More specifically, EPS loads (i.e. receivers of
electrical power) include avionics, propulsion, life support,
and thermal management. We now describe a small EPS
and how it may be formalized into a Bayesian network. The
EPS has some redundancy, as is typical for EPSs used in
aerospace, such that it supports reconfiguration. In this par-
ticular example, we assume that there are two batteries and
one load. At most one battery is allowed to power the load at
any one time, and we assume that at the current time, the con-
nected battery is failing to power the load. Then, a request for
power arrives (i.e., the relay before a load is turned on). The
System Configurator agent must now determine what com-
mands to give that will maximize the chance of power reach-
ing the load where it has been requested.
To illustrate this scenario, we consider the small EPS
shown in Figure 3. This figure shows how a load Load] can
be powered from either Battery] or Battery2 (note that both
of them should not power the load at the same time, since this
might cause a backward flow of energy from one battery into
the other). Suppose that Relay3 is closed, representing a re-
quest for power from fit. At the same time, Relay] is closed,
Relay2 is open, but Light] is low. This status is suggesting
Figure 3: The electrical power system for this case study.
that Load] is not powered by Battery], after all, even though
it should be. Further, suppose that Voltage] is low and Volt-
age2 is high, thus there is the potential for the load to be pow-
ered from an alternative energy source. Can we demonstrate
that our INFERDBN algorithm computes that Relay] should
be open, and Relay2 should be closed? Note that this involves
both diagnosis and reconfiguration, since the algorithm both
needs to figure out what is wrong and work around the prob-
lem.
This small EPS can be represented as a static BN as shown
in Figure 4. Compared to an ADAPT BN with 503 nodes, this
BN has been substantially simplified to illustrate our main
points. In this BN, nodes that have a prefix of Sensor or Com-
mand are evidence (i.e., input) nodes, while those with a pre-
fix of Health are query (i.e., output) nodes. Nodes that have
a prefix of Closed or Voltage represent, respectively, the state
of a part (such as a battery, a wire, a relay, or a load) or the
measured voltage. Broadly speaking, this BN represents how
power from the batteries, on the left in the figure, “flows”
to the load, on the right in the figure, in a left-to-right pat-
tern. More specifically, the Command nodes control, through
Closed nodes, how voltage propagates. In addition, there is
a constraint between Relays1 and Relay2, expressing the fact
that both should not be closed at the same time.
From this static BN, a DBN with two time slices was gen-
erated using the GENERATEDBN algorithm presented above.
We now discuss how this DBN, shown fully in Figure 6, can
be used in our case study.
Phase 1: We have commands and sensor readings as shown
in Figure 5. Note how the posterior over HealthBattery] t0
suggests that Battery] is not working, while the posterior
HealthBattery2t0 suggests that Battery2 is working. These
posteriors are very reasonable, given the commands given and
the sensor readings.
Phase 2: A Resource Requester expresses a need for Cur-
rentLoad] t] = currentHi.
Phase 3: Taking into account the state shown in Phase 1
as well as request in Phase 2, the MPE is computed, with
the result shown in Figure 6. Note in particular that Com-
mandRelay] t0 = cmdOpen and CommandRelay2t0 =
cmdClose, the opposite of what was the case in Phase 1. This
reflects the suspected poor health of Battery1 and good health
of Battery2.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
The long-term objective of this research is to enable inte-
grated diagnosis and reconfiguration to improve system au-
Figure 4: The static BN used in this case study before converting to a dynamic BN. The boxes that are covering their corre-
sponding nodes show the probability distribution for that node. Boxes with green highlighting derive their distributions from
Bayesian inference, and boxes with red highlighting are clamped to states known through evidence or desired states.
Figure 5: The half of our dynamic Bayesian network that corresponds to the current time step (t = 0). Note that the posterior
over HealthBattery1 t0 suggests that Battery1 is not working, while the posterior HealthBattery2t0 suggests that Battery2
is working.
Figure 6: The Bayesian network after it infers the commands at such that argmaxa, P(at l ot , gt+1, ˆht). Note that Com-
mandltelay1 t0 = cmdOpen and Commandltelay2t0 = cmdClose, the opposite of what was the case in Phase 1.
tonomy. As a step towards that objective, in this paper we
reported progress in the following two areas. First, we de-
veloped an approach to automatically generate a dynamic BN
from a static BN for a certain class of static BNs. Second, uti-
lizing the generated dynamic BN, we discussed an approach
for a System Configurator agent to handle requests from a
Resource Requester.
Our results are preliminary. In future work we plan to
first perform extensive reconfiguration experiments on elec-
trical power system testbeds such as the ADAPT testbed, and
then further develop the reconfiguration system with an eye
towards deployment on an aerospace vehicle. Another inter-
esting direction of further research is to extend the approach
with learning capabilities, having the agent use past experi-
ence to adjust the values within the dynamic Bayesian net-
work’s conditional probability tables.
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